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Many years hence, when the reaction of the 
past shall have left only the grand outline 
in view, this perhaps is how a philosopher 
will speak of it. He will say that the idea, 
peculiar to the nineteenth century, of 
employing science in the satisfaction of 
our material wants had given a wholly 
unforeseen extension to the mechanical 
arts and had equipped man in less than 
fifty years with more tools than he had 
made during the thousands of years he 
had lived on the earth. Each new machine 
being for man a new organ—an artificial 
organ which merely prolongs the natural 
organs—his body became suddenly and 
prodigiously increased in size, without his 
soul being able at the same time to dilate to 
the dimensions of his new body.
—Henri Bergson, The Meaning of the 
War1
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On August 25, 1914, almost two months from the outset of the First World War, the 
German army occupied the Belgian university city of Leuven, intentionally burning 
its University’s great library with its hundreds of thousands of manuscripts and 
books.4 It may be argued that the violation of this sanctuary of learning was the 
event that triggered a different aspect of the war, one fought between intellectuals, 
by the pen rather than by the sword. This is what we will refer to from now on, 
in the words of the Neo-Kantian philosopher Alois Riehl, as “the Cultural War 
[Kulturkrieg].”5
Having said for a long time that he was 
used up, finished, more old-fashioned 
in his pretended audacities than the 
most pompous nonentities, she now 
comprised that condemnation in a general 
indictment by saying that he was “pre-
war.” According to the little clan, the war 
had placed between him and the present, 
a gulf which relegated him to a past that 
was completely dead. Moreover—and that 
concerned rather the political world which 
was less well-informed—Mme. Verdurin 
represented him as done for, as complete a 
social as an intellectual outsider.
—Marcel Proust, Time Regained2
Ah, demons of the whirlwind, have a care,  
What, trumpeting your triumphs, ye undo!
—George Santayanna, “The 
Undergraduate Killed in Battle: Oxford, 
1915”3
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The destruction of the library immediately made world news headlines. A number 
of French and Belgian intellectuals wrote in protest against Germany’s brutality 
towards learning and culture. British writers and intellectuals gathered around 
Wellington House, also known as the War Propaganda Bureau, commissioning 
an onslaught of propaganda, some of which was pure fiction, against Germany’s 
barbarism in the so called “Rape of Belgium.” Under the August 1914 Defence of 
the Realm Act, Britain not only prohibited the teaching of German at schools, 
but also banned all books written in the German language. The German response 
came in the form of the notorious Manifesto of the Ninety-Three professors 
defending “Germany’s honour”6 against accusations of barbarism, proclaiming 
that Germany’s acts in Belgium were part of a war that was not caused by 
Germany, which was now obliged to fight in order to protect “the legacy of a 
Goethe, a Beethoven, and a Kant.”7 Numerous speeches and publications by 
German intellectuals, including almost all of the most prominent academic 
philosophers at the time, followed the line of the manifesto. The response by 
intellectuals around the world included those of prominent philosophers such 
as Bergson in France,8 and Dewey in the United States.9 This international turn 
against the German professors’ philosophical heroes seems to have, obviously 
very problematically, taken it for a fact that the legacy of 19th century figures such 
as Kant, Fichte, Hegel, or even Nietzsche, were in some sense rightly invoked by 
their self-proclaimed inheritors as justifiers of German militarism.
This paper will begin by exploring that part of what I referred to as the “cultural 
war” that has to do with philosophy. More specifically, as we shall see, the way 
philosophers in Britain and Germany dealt with the war is intimately related to 
this idea of the legacy of Kant and post-Kantian philosophy. More ambitiously, 
I will try to trace connections between the First World War and subsequent 
developments of factors that would gradually lead to the formation of the idea of 
a divide between analytic and continental philosophy. The study focuses on the 
rhetorical and outright propagandistic uses in which philosophy, or rather appeals 
to philosophy, were employed during the war (to the detriment of careful study 
of the arguments, which would require much longer study).10 The reason why 
focus on such surface impressions is useful here is because, as I shall show, it was 
such proclamations, rather than detailed philosophical argument, which shaped 
the subsequent history of philosophy, by giving philosophers excuses not to read 
some of their peers’ work.
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1. IT WAS ALL NIETZSCHE’S FAULT
The philosophy of F. W. Nietzsche was, perhaps above that of any other 
Germanophone thinker, the subject of most abuse during the war. As Nicholas 
Martin has shown,11 most of the wartime commentary on Nietzsche was based on 
gross exaggerations of doctrines that are either based on very selective readings 
of his work, or simply on ignorance of that work. The breakout of war, it seems, 
could be blamed on Nietzsche, due to the fact that Gavrilo Princip, who had 
assassinated Archduke Ferdinand, had been a follower of Nietzsche.12 And though 
the “Black Hands,” the Nietzsche-inspired secret society of which Princip was a 
member, had been militant against Austria’s annexation of Bosnia, this did not 
prevent British propagandists in the autumn of 1914 from identifying Nietzsche 
with the policies of the Kaiser.13 Nietzsche’s aphoristic texts, though explicitly 
anti-nationalistic and even anti-German, often develop romanticised images 
of war. This allowed for the projection of all sorts of meanings onto selected 
fragments. Nietzsche’s German publishers might have seen an opportunity for 
sales here. The war anthologies of Nietzsche’s work were best sellers among the 
German soldiers.14 According to the Nietzsche scholar Karl Jöel, this was evidence 
that “this people went to war with their souls.”15 This was the basis of the British 
propagandists’ myth that Thus Spake Zarathustra was somehow formally included 
in the Prussian infantry’s field packs, in place of the bible.16 The idea of Nietzsche 
as an obverse alternative to the bible disturbed Nietzsche’s British critics, as is 
reflected in the following lines of a poem by Edmond Holmes:
Christ or Nietzsche? Right or might?
Truth of Heaven or lies from Hell?
Healing balm or bursting shell?
Freedom’s day or serfdom’s night?17
Yet despite the potential ease with which Nietzsche could be abused by the 
popular press for the purposes of propaganda, once the professional philosophers 
stepped in the arena the project was abandoned.18 Nietzsche was neither on the 
minds nor on the reading lists of many academic philosophers at the time.19 In fact, 
Nietzsche’s depiction as the mastermind behind the Kaiser’s policies was the first 
acquaintance with his thought for many in the Anglophone world. Furthermore, 
in Germany the mainstream of academic philosophy was dominated by Neo-
Kantianism, whose mainly epistemological conception of philosophy had little 
to do with Nietzsche.20 Some German academics, for example Wilhelm Dilthey 
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and Rudolf Eucken, did already draw inspiration from Nietzsche’s work prior 
to the war. Another exceptional case was Bergson, who was himself not in the 
mainstream of French academic philosophy but rather, like Nietzsche, had at the 
time a more broad impact on an intellectual elite beyond the circles of academia. 
These would be the sources from which, at the end of the war, the predominantly 
Germanophone tradition of Lebensphilosophie would be put together to challenge 
the Neo-Kantian establishment.
What was on the minds of mainstream academics, nonetheless, was a 
Germanophone tradition of philosophy that had begun with Kant.21 As a reviewer 
of Dewey’s wartime polemic for the New York Times put it, 
Not Nietzsche, but Immanuel Kant is responsible for the spirit of twentieth 
century Germany. Not belief in the superman but belief in the categorical 
imperative and the thing-in-itself has sent Germany to war with the world. 
Not Thus Spake Zarathustra but the Critique of Pure Reason explains the 
amazing utterances of Bernhardi, of Treitschke, of Wilhelm himself.22
The claim that Kant, a staunch defender of cosmopolitanism and “perpetual 
peace,” was in any way responsible for the war appears even more controversial 
than the idea that the anti-Prussian Nietzsche was posthumously guiding the 
Kaiser’s hand. Had we not already come across the Manifesto of the 93, we might 
have been severely puzzled as to where someone like Dewey could have gotten 
the impression that Kant was somehow responsible for the war. It is, therefore, to 
the Germanophone claims to the legacy of Kant that we must now turn.
2. WAR AND THE GERMAN LEGACY OF KANT
As Beiser has maintained, the period from the middle of the 19th century up to 
the outbreak of the First World War can, without exaggeration, be described 
as “one of the most creative and revolutionary periods of modern philosophy,” 
even if it has been “little studied in German [and] even less in English.”23 The 
metaphilosophical debates taking place during this period, revolving around 
a certain crisis regarding philosophy’s self-conception, were crucial in shaping 
philosophy’s reaction to the successes of the positive sciences in the 19th 
century. From the 1890s to 1914, Germanophone academic philosophy was 
mainly concerned with the methodological issue of criticising “psychologism,”24 
in parallel to related methodological projects of critique directed against various 
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other vague “isms” such as positivism, historicism, materialism, and relativism.25 
The emergence of experimental psychology laboratories raised the question of 
whether psychologists should hold positions in philosophy departments, an issue 
that is inseparable from philosophical critiques of psychologism.
One of the first overt attacks against psychologism is to be found in the work of 
Frege, whose hostile review of Husserl’s brand of psychologism seems to have 
disrupted the correspondence between these two “grandfathers” (as Michael 
Dummett calls them) of, respectively, analytic philosophy and continental 
phenomenology.26 Whatever one thinks of the heated debate during the past few 
decades over the relationship between Frege’s and Husserl’s anti-psychologism, 
Husserl’s claim to refute psychologism in the first volume of his Logische 
Untersuchungen (1900) is clearly the origin of the controversy known as the 
Psychologismusstreit that remained at the forefront of Germanophone philosophy 
for the next fourteen years, and which (alongside almost all other philosophical 
activity in the Germanophone world), came to a halt with the start of the war. 
Philosophy’s identity crisis,27 of which the turn-of-the-century anti-psychologism 
had been a result, seemed to have found a temporary solution in philosophers’ 
assuming the role of defenders of Germany’s cause.28
It is perhaps telling that, one hundred years later, German philosophers’ wartime 
writings mostly remain untranslated in English. By contrast to the unrefined 
accusations against Nietzsche, these were attempts to justify the war by men 
who had devoted their lives to rational thought. It is thus even more troubling 
that such men could allow themselves to join the supposed general enthusiasm 
for the war. Neo-Kantian philosophers, who had seen themselves as inheritors of 
the legacy of Enlightenment humanism, would come to write tracts celebrating 
Germany’s cause. Perhaps the most unexpected aspect of Neo-Kantian support for 
German militarism was that offered by Herman Cohen, the head of the Marburg 
school of Neo-Kantianism, who also happened to be Jewish. In a 1914 address to 
the Kant Society of Berlin, Cohen repeats a refrain that would be found in the 
“Manifesto of the 93” when he attacks the distinction between culture and its 
defence through war, conjoining Germany as a nation of poets with Germany as a 
nation of soldiers.29 According to Cohen,
Germany is and remains in continuity with the eighteenth century and 
its cosmopolitan humanity ... [In] us there struggles the originality of a 
nation with which no other can compare.30
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For Cohen, there appears to be no clash between the cosmopolitan Enlightenment 
values to which he aspired and Germany’s participation in the war. Or, as the 
“Manifesto of the 93” puts it:
Without German militarism, German civilization would have vanished 
long ago from the face of the earth ... [The] German army and German 
people are one.31
This idea of the oneness of the German people and the army seems to go some 
way to explaining why at the start of the war philosophers ceased their disputes 
over psychologism and adjusted to their new role as the army’s propagandists.32
One of the most prolific of the philosopher-propagandists during the war was 
another Neo-Kantian, Paul Natorp. Our puzzlement regarding the possible 
alignment of Kantian Enlightenment values, socialist politics, and Prussian 
militarism was not shared by Natorp, who based one of his arguments in favour 
of the war on this seemingly incoherent alignment. In his 1915 book Der Tag 
des Deutschen,33 Natorp claims that, by contrast to the Western countries that 
had dedicated their efforts to imperial conquests, Germany had developed 
its philosophy. Somehow, the superiority of German academic-philosophical 
learning made it a good candidate for winning the war. Furthermore, Germany 
had applied its philosophical advances to the idea of a society based on reason. 
Socialism and militarism could come together in a society where “the autonomy 
of rational will”34 would be the basic organising principle. This Kantian form of 
socialism, according to Natorp, justified Germany’s war.35
Neo-Kantian philosophical defences of the Kaiser’s position in the war such 
as Natorp’s, were typical of the German professoriate’s defence of German 
militarism. We can view Natorp’s defence as a development of the quasi-Kantian 
ideal of a non-individualistic, non-egalitarian socialism that went hand-in-hand 
with a critique of Western European capitalistic societies, especially Britain. One 
aspect of this criticism was developed by the economist and sociologist Werner 
Sombart, who in a 1915 pamphlet famously interpreted the war in the Western front 
as one between “traders” [Händler] and “heroes” [Helden].36 Obviously Sombart’s 
heroes were German, while the traders were English. According to Sombart, the 
English capitalists are traders in that they view the world in terms of transactions, 
positioning themselves as the ones who receive. By contrast, the German hero 
“approaches life with the question: what can I give you?.”37 The former is not 
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only characteristic of English society, but also of the philosophy developed by 
that society. Sombart traces a trajectory of the “trader’s spirit,” starting from 
Bacon and leading up to utilitarian ethics, which he sees as characterised by 
individualism. The ideal life lived according to the Benthamite principle of “the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number” is interpreted by Sombart as resulting 
in “comfort with respectability: apple pie and Sunday service, peaceableness and 
football, money-making and leisure for some hobby.”38 When applied to political 
theory, the “trader’s spirit” leads to a kind of fear of the state, advocating non-
interventionist policies which would allow traders to comfortably go on with 
their transactions.
Sombart’s division between traders and heroes can be seen as relying on an older 
distinction developed in Germanophone academia prior to the war, between 
culture and civilisation. The German “mandarin” academics, as Fritz Ringer 
calls them, had sought to justify their existence by appeal to the notion that the 
civilisations which developed through technological progress in the Western 
world were lacking the inner cultivation that constitutes a culture. Therefore 
the German state required a learned intellectual elite which would uphold its 
traditions, keeping the flame of this culture alive in German Universities. It is 
notable that, like Natorp’s idea of a community of “autonomous rational wills,” 
the division between civilisation and culture can be traced to Kant, who discusses 
it as follows:
We are cultivated to a great extent by the arts and the sciences. And we 
are civilized to a troublesome degree in all forms of social courteousness 
and decency. But to consider ourselves to be already fully moralized is 
quite premature. For the idea of morality is part of culture. But the use of 
this idea, which leads only to that which resembles morality in the love of 
honor and outward decency, comprises only mere civilization.39
While clearly a distortion of Kant’s views, the Neo-Kantian philosopher Alois 
Riehl would come to see the division between civilisation and culture as that 
over which the war was fought.  According to Riehl, Germany’s enemies had been 
characterised by civilisations directly determined by the advances of technology 
and capitalism. Riehl seems to be in line with Sombart’s critique of utilitarianism 
when he claims that calculative, instrumental uses of reason belong still to the 
realm of technological civilisation. According to Riehl, in a line that anticipates 
subsequent continental critiques of the relation between rationality and techno-
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capitalism, “Even intellectualism, i.e. the training of our understanding, is no 
more than civilisation, it is merely something external.”40 It is against this mere 
civilisation, and in defence of culture, that Germany must go to a war. Echoing 
Cohen’s idea of cosmopolitanism, Riehl claims that “[w]e fight this war in order 
to preserve and improve our culture, and we know that thereby we fight for the 
future of mankind.”41
3. NEGOTIATING THE LEGACY OF GERMAN IDEALISM
It is not surprising, given the claims about Kant involved in German philosophical 
propaganda, that Anglophone philosophers would raise issues regarding the 
association of the German Idealist tradition with German militarism. As already 
mentioned, the debate begins with Dewey’s indictment of the idealists in his 1915 
German Philosophy and Politics, which of course is more scholarly than its New York 
Times review cited above. Dewey’s book issues a serious challenge to the idealistic 
establishment in the Anglophone philosophical world, from which his own 
thought had emerged prior to the war. The controversy that ensues dominates 
British philosophical debate during the war, and revolves around issues to do with 
political philosophy and international relations. One of the most well known takes 
on this debate comes from the dedication of Hobhouse’s 1918 The Metaphysical 
Theory of the State, a letter to his son who is fighting in the trenches. It begins by 
juxtaposing the image of their reading Kant together in their home garden before 
the war began, to that of his reading Hegel while Hobhouse hears German planes 
over London:
Was this a time for theorizing or destroying theories, when the world was 
tumbling about our ears? My second thoughts ran otherwise. To each man 
the tools and weapons that he can best use. In the bombing of London I 
had just witnessed the visible and tangible outcome of a false and wicked 
doctrine, the foundations of which lay, as I believe, in the book before 
me. To combat this doctrine effectively is to take such part in the fight 
as the physical disabilities of middle age allow. Hegel himself carried the 
proof-sheets of his first work to the printer through streets crowded with 
fugitives from the field of Jena. With that work began the most penetrating 
and subtle of all the intellectual influences which have sapped the rational 
humanitarianism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and in the 
Hegelian theory of the god-state all that I had witnessed lay implicit. You 
may meet his Gothas in mid air, and may the full power of a just cause be 
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with you. I must be content with more pedestrian methods. But “to make 
the world a safe place for democracy,” the weapons of the spirit are as 
necessary as those of the flesh.42
Though for Hobhouse the attack on Hegelian political philosophy had seemed 
an obvious contribution to the war effort, it was not at all clear that this was 
a conception of patriotic duty shared by all British philosophers. The influence 
of German high culture, including German Idealism, had been a force that had 
shaped British philosophy prior to the war.43 This is why most British attacks 
against Kant and Hegel were directed against their British advocates, not the 
German professors.
In response to allegations of responsibility for the war made against German 
philosophical theories of the state, the German-British pragmatist philosopher 
at Oxford, F. C. S. Scott Schiller, would argue in his review of Dewey’s German 
Philosophy and Politics that
The large and influential section of our rulers which was educated at 
Balliol by T. H. Green and his followers has been for years indoctrinating 
us with this same theory [that of German philosophy] without any terrible 
effects. So may not the verdict of history be that philosophic ideas had as 
little to do with it as with other wars?44
Schiller’s approach characterises the British Idealists’ response to their opponents, 
whose attacks were epitomised in the charge directed against Bosanquet of being 
a “Prusso-phil [sic] philosopher.”45 To such charges, the general response seems 
to have been an acceptance of a certain degree of philosophical Prussophilia, to 
be distinguished from other forms of Prussophilia. In other words, Anglophone 
philosophers influenced by Germanophone thought would insist, as Schiller does, 
that Germanophone philosophy has little to do with German militarism. For this 
they would need to uphold the distinction between German culture and Prussian 
militarism which the German professors had vehemently attacked.
One may object to the idea of the pervasiveness of Germanophone influence on 
British academic philosophy by claiming that British Idealism had, by the time of 
the war, been overthrown by an even more purely British philosophical movement, 
analytic philosophy. This is a distorted picture on two levels. On the one hand, it 
would be wrong to imagine British Idealism to have simply vanished due to Russell 
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and Moore’s criticisms, which did not result in the immediate resignation of all 
British Idealists from their academic positions.46 British philosophy departments 
would include members working in the British Idealist tradition until long after 
the First World War. In fact, it had been Russell, and not the British Idealists 
whom he criticised, who would lose his academic position during the war, due to 
his pacifist stance. On the other hand, it would be wrong to believe the subsequent 
depiction of the birth of analytic philosophy as a somehow particularly British 
philosophical revolution. As David Bell has argued, rather than seeing the analytic 
“coup” as a revolutionary act of creation ex nihilo, as it was commonly portrayed 
after the war, it would be more correct to view it as based on Russell and Moore’s 
acquaintance with developments which had taken place in Germanophone 
philosophical debates of the latter half of the 19th century.47 One can trace a line 
of influence on pre-war British philosophy by a series of Germanophone thinkers 
opposed to German Idealism, including Herbart, Bolzano, and Brentano.48
Because Hegel and Kant, not the lesser known Bolzano or Brentano, were at the 
epicentre of the cultural wars, the British Idealists could be seen Prussophile, while 
Russell and Moore could add the epiphenomenal label of ‘Britishness’ to what 
would later be called “analytic philosophy.” Though this label made little difference 
to the way in which the content of analytic philosophy developed, we can see it 
as a precursor for subsequent troubled relations with non-analytic philosophical 
trends. We could say that it is the condition of possibility for carelessly bundling 
all non-analytic approaches to Western philosophy as “continental.”
4. AFTER THE WAR
Let us now move on to how things turned out after the war. The international 
academic scene immediately after the war was shaped by the boycotting of German 
and Austrian academics from international scholarly associations, conferences, 
or other events.49 By contrast to the prominence that German Universities 
enjoyed in international academic networks prior to the war, they now found 
themselves isolated. Furthermore, due to the post-war economy, a large number 
of Germanophone University graduates would find themselves unable to secure 
academic positions.
It is possible here to generalise regarding the divergent ways in which the legacy 
of the cultural wars was worked through during the decade following the end 
of hostilities. For Germanophone philosophy, this would be played out in the 
94 · andreas vrahimis  
gradual dissociation of a younger generation of philosophers from the Neo-
Kantian establishment that had participated in the cultural wars. By contrast, 
one might argue that British philosophy simply incorporated the polemic against 
Anglo-German Idealism developed during the war into its self-image. The British 
Idealist tradition was portrayed as having died out after the war, while the analytic 
tradition which would come to replace British Idealism as the mainstream in 
academic philosophy, despite having avoided participation in the cultural wars,50 
would eventually grow willing to adopt its designation as somehow more British 
than its idealist predecessor.51
In what follows I will illustrate these developments by focusing on two events 
that shaped interwar philosophy. The first is Husserl’s 1922 lecture series at UCL, 
while the second is the 1929 Davos Hochschule. Both events were conceived as 
efforts towards overcoming the war’s effects. As I will show, both are also crucial 
in understanding the development of the idea of the analytic/continental divide.
4a. Husserl’s UCL lectures
When Russell was imprisoned for his activities in favour of pacifism in 1918, he 
took with him a copy of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen. Despite the ban on 
German books during the war, Russell had planned on reviewing the book for 
Mind. His philosophical views had already been seen, prior to the war, by the 
modernist poet and self-professed dilettante philosopher T. E. Hulme as somehow 
close to those proposed by Husserl.52 Unfortunately Hulme would go on to die in 
the same war which he had bitterly defended against Russell’s pacifism, and so 
his idea of the proximity of Russell and Husserl’s philosophy was never seriously 
fleshed out. Russell never finished his projected review of Husserl, though he did 
write a letter to Husserl about it.53 He seems to have thought highly of the book, 
which he would later praise as being “a monumental work” which he sees as part 
of “a revolt against German idealism ... from a severely technical standpoint” and 
which he places alongside the work of Frege, Moore, and himself.54 
It might seem puzzling, then, that analytic philosophers seemingly did not pay 
much attention to one of their founding fathers’ praise of phenomenology. It 
should be noted however that, whether or not due to Russell’s sympathy, a number 
of analytic philosophers had indeed been interested in phenomenology at around 
this time, among whom we might mention Carnap who studied under Husserl, 
Wittgenstein who at some point during the twenties would see his own work as 
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phenomenology, and Ryle who mentions in his autobiography that he taught a 
course titled “Logical Objectivism: Bolzano, Brentano, Husserl and Meinong” at 
Oxford in the 1920s.55
Ryle nonetheless mentions that the course was unwanted. This may have to 
do with the fact that Husserl had been the first Germanophone philosopher to 
lecture in Britain after the war. Husserl’s lecture series at UCL has been seen as a 
fiasco that failed to win over any converts to phenomenology (with the possible 
exception of Ryle), or to have convinced any British philosophers that willingness 
to read Germanophone philosophers might be rewarding.56 This has less to do 
with the ideas that Husserl presented to his British audience than the way in 
which he presented them. Husserl’s lectures, presented in German, seem to have 
presumed some familiarity with Husserl’s earlier work and jargon. It did not help 
that Husserl had decided that it would be appropriate to name his philosophy 
“transcendental idealism,” which would not win him any friends in 1922. Russell’s 
clarification that Husserl’s work was in fact part of a revolution against German 
Idealism came too late, and was not substantial enough to reverse the bad 
impression Husserl had left. And whereas he would tell his French audience, in 
much better French, that he was an unorthodox Cartesian – thereby paving the 
way for his canonization in France (a point further reinforced by the Franco-
German philosophical rapprochement that would take place at Davos, to which 
we now turn) – Husserl’s English translation had implied to his British audience 
that he was in the line of influence of Kant and Hegel. 
4b. Davos: The demise of Neo-Kantianism
German interwar philosophy was marked by the demise of the old Neo-Kantian 
philosophical schools, and this decline is arguably crucial to the development 
of the idea of an analytic/ continental divide. As Michael Friedman has shown,57 
understanding one of the crucial moments in the history of the divide, namely 
Carnap’s polemic against Heidegger, requires a background understanding of 
the decline of Neo-Kantianism. In fact, as I have argued elsewhere, the Carnap-
Heidegger affair is best understood in the context of a certain polarisation within 
Germanophone philosophy, a consequence of the decline of the old establishment, 
rather than as part of an analytic/continental divide characterised by a lack of 
engagement between camps. 58 There were, of course, more than two candidates 
for the philosophical throne of the Neo-Kantians, and one could see the end of 
the war as being cause for a general reassessment of Kant’s legacy by various 
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philosophical schools including Lebensphilosophie, Marxism, Phenomenology, 
Frankfurt School Critical Theory, Heideggerian Existentialism, and Logical 
Positivism.59 Nevertheless, explaining the decline of Neo-Kantianism is crucial 
for understanding the move from interwar philosophy to the development of the 
analytic/ continental divide. One could attempt to explain it by the mere fact that 
almost all the Neo-Kantians, with the exception of Ernst Cassirer, had either died 
or retired soon after the war.60 Yet, as Beiser puts it, this supposed explanation 
“begs the question why no one came to replace them.”61 
There seem to remain two main options for explaining Neo-Kantianism’s 
interwar decline. The standard account portrays the rationalistic Neo-Kantians 
in struggle with the irrationalism of Lebensphilosophie and Heideggerianism. 
The tale to be told in favour of this view is tightly interwoven with the legacy 
of the First World War, as well as the development of the idea of the opposition 
of a continental (primarily Franco-German) philosophy to Anglophone analytic 
philosophy. The symbolic death of Neo-Kantian philosophy has commonly been 
seen as taking place in the 1929 Davos Hochschule. This had been part of a series 
of annual meetings at Davos conceived of as a “Locarno for intellectuals,”62 a 
post-war rapprochement between French and German academics. The high point 
of the proceedings was a formal dispute between Cassirer and Heidegger over 
the legacy of Kant. This would be attended by numerous French and German 
philosophers, including Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice de Gandillac, Jean Cavaillès, 
Léon Brunschvicg, Eugen Fink, Joachim Ritter, Otto Friedrich Bollnow, and Rudolf 
Carnap. For various reasons, which I have discussed elsewhere, the meeting was 
popularly depicted in terms of a victory on Heidegger’s behalf.63 Thus the effort 
at Franco-German re-acquaintance would result in a generation of young French 
philosophers taking the news of Heidegger’s victory back to France, leading to 
the eventual popular triumph of existentialism after the Second World War. On 
the Austro-German side, however, this would result in an analytic critique of 
Heidegger, as well as a subsequent critique of both Heidegger and his analytic 
critics by the Frankfurt School.64  Carnap’s polemical challenge was issued at first 
in the context of a lecture to the students of the Dessau Bauhaus in September 
1929, where Carnap would encourage artists and designers to fill in the gap which 
is left once metaphysical nonsense (exemplified by Heidegger’s pronouncement 
that “Das Nichts selbst nichtet”) is overcome. Carnap’s attack was, however, 
accompanied in that same year by sympathetic remarks on Heidegger by both 
Wittgenstein (who claimed that he “can readily think what Heidegger means by 
Being and Dread”)65 and Ryle. Ryle’s self-proclaimed sympathy towards Heidegger 
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does not seem to preclude him from prophesying that phenomenology is “at 
present heading for bankruptcy and disaster and will end either in self-ruinous 
Subjectivism or in a windy mysticism.”66
To go back, however, to our question regarding Neo-Kantianism’s decline, we may 
here turn to one of the most common depictions of Cassirer and Heidegger at 
Davos, as offered by Hendrik Pos. Pos contrasts the “Apollonian” figure of Ernst 
Cassirer, “the heir of Kant ... tall, powerful, serene,”67 with Heidegger, who he sees 
as harbouring “feelings of loneliness, of oppression, and of frustration, such as 
one has in anxious dreams.”68 Such feelings, Pos goes on to argue, were shared 
by the academic youth of Germany, which turned to Heidegger due to sharing 
such feelings with him rather than due to the philosophical content of his work. 
Notice that Cassirer could be portrayed, 15 years after the war, as a rationalistic 
proponent of the Weimar Republic continuing the Neo-Kantians’ legacy. After 
the war, the remaining Neo-Kantians had followed a portion of German academia 
in defending the Weimar Republic against its numerous critics,69 epitomised 
by Cassirer’s lecture on the occasion of its tenth anniversary in 1928.70 Thus, to 
summarise this way of explaining the decline of Neo-Kantianism, we could say 
that it fell, together with the Republic, by the hand of its irrationalist enemies.
There is, however, another possible explanation, which would at least partly locate 
Neo-Kantianism’s decline in the stance it defended during the First World War.71 
Though one may argue that beyond the surface appearance of jingoism there had 
been a rational force at work in Neo-Kantianism’s war-time arguments,72 they 
had been rendered irrelevant by the Central Powers’ defeat. Furthermore, one 
might argue that the war had arbitrarily put the significant philosophical debates 
in which the Neo-Kantians had been engaged before 1914 to an end. Not only 
had these establishment figures arguably given up serious philosophy in order 
to become propagandists, but furthermore their pre-war philosophical views 
seemed to have little relevance to what was interesting and new in the post-war 
philosophical scene. The fundamental distrust towards modernity characteristic 
of the academic establishment prior to the war was sidelined by the new varieties 
of modernism in philosophy as much as in other aspects of culture, including a 
kind of “reactionary modernism.”73
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CONCLUSION: THE RELATION BETWEEN THE WAR AND THE DIVIDE
Having presented this overview of the situation that developed between 1914 and 
1929, we can go on to ask how it was that the war and its legacy contributed to 
the subsequent emergence of the idea that philosophy is divided into two camps, 
analytic and continental. To clarify, I talk about its subsequent emergence since, 
prior to the Second World War, no philosopher had thought in such terms, and 
thus to imagine that the idea of the divide existed in the interwar period would 
be anachronistic. [Indeed the first explicit mention of a divide between English 
and Franco-German philosophy that I have been able to trace was uttered by 
Georges Bataille in 1951, after a night of drinking with A. J. Ayer and Merleau-
Ponty. Furthermore, though the term “analytic philosophy” had been used by 
Collingwood in the 1930s to describe a certain tendency of thought to which he 
was opposed.74 The term would only play a significant role in the self-perception 
of analytic philosophers with the end of the Second World War.]
Scholars have connected the war to the divide in different ways. Peter Simons, for 
example, notes that the death of Adolf Reinach (Husserl’s former star-student) 
in the trenches, would allow phenomenology to take the Heideggerian path that 
it did. 75 Had Reinach lived, it might have been possible to see Carnap’s polemic 
against Heidegger as siding with a phenomenological opposition to Heidegger 
rather than an opposition to phenomenology tout court. However, while Simons 
correctly notes that the effects of the war on the divide are uncertain, and so goes 
on to discuss the crucial issue of the demise of Neo-Kantianism and the rise of 
Heideggerianism without any other reference to the war, as I have shown above, 
the war is clearly of central importance to it.
A way of linking the war to the divide through the sociology of knowledge has 
recently been offered by Steve Fuller.76 Fuller seeks to explain the German 
academics’ pronouncements in favour of militarism by appeal to the idea that 
the perceived superiority of Germany over the Western powers was due to the 
superiority of its academic learning. Fuller then sees the subsequent developments 
in philosophy which lead to the analytic/continental divide as responses to the 
perceived failure of the German University system, associated with losing the 
war. Though this perception of failure may be partly correct in connection to our 
question regarding the demise of Neo-Kantianism, Fuller’s account unfortunately 
contains a problematic degree of over-generalisation. For example, he associates 
German learning with “German Idealism,” paying little attention to the important 
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developments in Germanophone philosophy after Hegel and up to the war (which 
one might want to refrain from placing under the banner of German Idealism).77 
It might, however, be significant to look at Fuller’s proposal as one of the multiple 
aspects of the phenomenon of the demise of Neo-Kantianism and its effects on 
interwar Germanophone academic philosophy.
A more precise take on the relationship between the war and the divide was 
recently presented by Jack Reynolds, who has argued that the war led to a 
split over the relation between philosophy and politics or history.78 Analytic 
philosophy becomes, according to Reynolds, a kind of philosophy that dissociates 
itself from politics, while the various strands of continental philosophy are 
characterised by an embededness of political thinking in their theorising. Even if 
analytic philosophy is to be thought of as associated with this meta-philosophical 
demarcation from politics (conceived in non-essentialist terms as a family 
resemblance), there is nonetheless a particular element in post-war analytic 
philosophy that Reynolds’ view does not seem able to account for. The extrusion 
of politics from interwar philosophy (and vice versa, i.e. the prohibition against 
the uses, which are necessarily abuses, of philosophy in political life), is not only 
to be found in philosophers’ silence about politics. It is also exemplified not only 
by Russell’s revival of the critique against German Idealism,79 with its references 
to “the German treatment of Belgium,”80 but also by Neurath’s Anti-Spengler,81 in 
many ways a prequel to Carnap’s criticisms of Heidegger.82 In the case of Neurath, 
who was writing while imprisoned for his participation in the Bavarian Soviet 
Republic in 1919, the banishment of philosophy (or, as Neurath puts it, “pseudo-
rationalism”) from the sphere of political action is clearly a political project: “Anti-
metaphysicians strengthen the force of the proletariat.”83 Neurath was perhaps 
exceptional in explicitly linking the anti-metaphysical work of logical positivism 
to Marxist political action. There was, however, an implicit remnant of Neurath’s 
spirit in the overall project of segregating analytic philosophy and politics. Though 
most early analytic philosophers did conceive of philosophy as politically neutral, 
this was, in many cases, itself a political position. It might further be noted that 
analytic philosophy’s political neutrality was formed in opposition to views of the 
embededness of political thinking in philosophy that were perceived as connected 
with the war (e.g. contra Hegel, Spengler, or Heidegger).
As already mentioned, some of the developments surrounding the Great War 
and its aftermath  can be seen as constituting conditions of possibility for the 
emergence of the idea of the divide. It would be mistaken to think of philosophy 
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during the interwar period as divided into two and only two warring camps, since 
it involves a plurality of factions. That is not to say that there are no interesting 
philosophical disagreements, or clashing metaphilosophical conceptions, during 
the period we are discussing. It is rather to say that a schema based on bilateral 
opposition is inadequate for capturing interwar philosophical debates. One 
could suggest an alternative schema: that of a branching out from an older order 
centred around types of Kantian or post-Kantian idealist philosophy, towards 
various “revolts” against the old establishment. The old establishment was one in 
which idealist philosophers could meaningfully debate amongst themselves and 
with rival non-idealist philosophers. The various “revolts” against idealism take 
place in such a way as to allow a limited degree of dialogue with rival idealists, but 
somehow muddle dialogue with rival “revolutionaries.”
Of course there are various limitations to this schema. First of all, in being 
schematic, it might fail to account for all significant details. This is, nonetheless, 
the kind of trouble that is faced by such attempts at generalisation, and is perhaps 
tolerable only by contrast to the kind of over-generalisation included in the idea of 
an analytic/continental divide. A particular problem, however, which arises from 
the general schema is its portrayal of a quasi-unity of pre-war idealist philosophy, 
which is presupposed in the notion that pre-war philosophers were somehow 
more able to engage in a supra-national exchange of views. Again, though this is 
limiting with regard to the schema at hand, if one contrasts it with the schema of 
an analytic/continental divide it becomes clear that it is a more likely candidate 
for a verifiable claim: the numbers of philosophers involved in idealistic schools 
between the 19th century and the Great War are far fewer than those involved in 
the analytic/continental divide.
Prior to the war, Anglophone, Francophone, and Germanophone philosophers 
may be seen as having, to a large extent, been able to converse about their shared 
concerns over the legacy of thinkers such as Kant or Hegel. Germanophone 
academia had established international prestige through scholarly networks which 
ensured that being versed in some form of Germanophone learning was an integral 
part of academic training throughout the world. The war caused the collapse of 
these networks, and the effects of this collapse included a cultural war between 
philosophers in Germany, Britain, France, and the United States. In the aftermath 
of the war, German scholars were excluded from international academic activity. 
And whereas Franco-German philosophical relations would be rekindled after the 
war at affairs like Davos, British hostilities toward German philosophy would not 
legacies of german idealism · 101 
come to be revised after the war. This, I claim, is the cultural-political framework 
in which the development of the idea of the analytic/ continental divide became 
possible. 84
—University of Cyprus
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